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Abstract
The paper analyzes the dynamics of demand for three options when
agents differ in their preferences for conformity. Each agent seeks to
imitate others who are more individualistic and to distinguish her-
self from others who are more conformist, relative to herself. In each
period, every agent chooses her utility-maximizing option given each
agent’s demand in the previous period. It is shown that for a large
class of initial demand distributions, demand dynamics resemble fash-
ion cycles: Total demand for each option over time is wave-like, and,
when positively demanded, an option trickles through the entire pop-
ulation, from individualistic towards conformist agents.
Keywords: fashion cycle, demand cycle, conformity, individuality,
dynamics, distribution of demand
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1 Introduction
Many choice categories exhibit trends and fashions which come and go. Old
fashions are replaced by new ones in an everlasting repetition. Once a new
fashion enters the market, initial demand for it is low. Then demand grows
until it reaches a peak, and finally declines until the fashion entirely dis-
appears. These demand dynamics are the life cycle of a fashion. When
one fashion disappears, the life cycle of the next fashion takes off (Kotler,
1997, p. 533). In this sense, we can speak of continuous fashion cycles.
Clothing, food and nutrition, sports, neighborhoods, holiday destinations,
topics in academia are only some categories among many which feature fash-
ion cycles. This paper proposes a model to explain fashion cycles through
heterogeneous conformity and individuality preferences of consumers.
Anecdotal evidence for heterogeneous preferences for individuality and
conformity is manifold. Statements like “you cannot wear these glasses any-
more, everybody is wearing them now” or “I do not like this band anymore,
they have become so popular that they even charge for their concerts” ex-
press the wish to distinguish oneself from the majority. On the other hand,
mottos like “do as your neighbors do” or “all my friends have x, so I also
want x” express the wish to conform. Intuitively, this distinctive behavior of
some parts of the population together with the imitative behavior of other
parts of the population leads to an ever-going change in fashions.
Heterogeneous conformity and counterconformity preferences have been
confirmed by sociological and psychological research. In an early seminal ex-
periment Asch (1951) found different tendencies among subjects to conform
to the majority. Some subjects conformed to the majority in order not to
differ, others “withdrew” from the majority because of the desire of “being
an individual”. Snyder and Fromkin (1980) introduced the uniqueness the-
ory according to which an individual’s need for uniqueness determines how
similar or dissimilar she wants to be to others. Lynn and Harris (1997),
Ariely and Levav (2000) and Timmor and Katz-Navon (2008) have provided
empirical evidence that an individual’s distinctive behavior in various envi-
ronments is driven by her need for uniqueness. Berger and Heath (2008)
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adduce an individual’s desire to distinguish herself from disliked others as a
further argument for counter-conformity.
Traditionally, fashion cycles have been a topic of sociological research. Ve-
blen (1912), Simmel (1957) and Bourdieu (1984, 1993) proposed the trickle-
down theory as an explanation of fashion cycles. According to the trickle-
down theory, fashion goods serve upper classes to distinguish themselves from
lower classes who in turn emulate the upper classes. Thus fashions move from
the upper classes down to the lower classes. In criticism of the trickle-down
theory, Blumer (1969), Sproles (1981), McCracken (1988), King (1965), Field
(1970), Vejlgaard (2008) separate fashion leadership from the upper class and
argue that fashion innovators and leaders can come from any class, also lower
classes and subcultures. They do not see the primary purpose of fashion in
class distinction. Groups in the fashion diffusion process are roughly di-
vided into “innovators, leaders, followers, and participants” (Blumer, 1969)
whereby fashions trickle from innovators, over leaders and followers to partic-
ipants. The underlying, not explicitly stated driving forces of these fashion
cycle theories are heterogeneous conformity and counter-conformity prefer-
ences. Park (1998), Cholachatpinyo et al. (2002) and Workman and Kidd
(2000) explicitly link the fashion process to heterogeneous (counter-) confor-
mity preferences. They provide empirical evidence that fashion innovators
are driven by a need to distinguish themselves and to be unique, whereas fol-
lowers have stronger preferences for being similar to others and to conform.
This paper presents a formal economic model of fashion cycles which is
in line with the above sociological theories. The model explains the typical
fashion life cycle which is the bell-shaped demand for the fashion item over
time, and the “trickling” process of the fashion item from innovators over
leaders and followers to participants through heterogeneous (counter-) con-
formity preferences. Specifically, we propose a discrete time model in which
the population is infinitely heterogeneous with respect to conformity prefer-
ences. Each agent’s conformity preference is defined by her location in the
unit interval. In each period, every agent decides which one of three option
to consume on the basis of the previous period distribution of demand across
the population. We show that for a large class of initial distributions the
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dynamics of demand converge to an infinitely repeated unique sequence of
demand distributions spanning eight time periods. Given these dynamics,
the demand for each option over time is given by consecutive, bell-shaped
life cycles. Having completed one life cycle, an option stays out of the mar-
ket for one time period, and then enters into another life cycle. Within each
life cycle, the option trickles deterministically through society. The model
replicates fashion cycles and predicts the revival of fashions given a limited
set of choice options.
Another driver for fashion cycles, different from heterogeneous conformity
preferences, has been explored by Pesendorfer (1995). He shows that when
consumption choice is a signaling device for an unobserved “quality” of the
consumer, then dynamic demand for different designs which are subsequently
developed and sold by a monopolist resembles fashion cycles. In his model,
a new design serves as a signaling device for “high” types because of a high
initial price which prevents “low” types from buying the design. Over time,
the monopolist decreases the price such that more “low” types buy the design,
and the value as signal for high types is lost. At this point, the monopolist
introduces a new design at a high price which serves as a new signaling
device, and so on. This model cannot explain fashion cycles in categories in
which options have the same (or no) price, for example, given first names
(Yoganarasimhan, 2017). Moreover, it does not account for the fact that
trends are often started by individuals with a low willingness to pay or with
a low budget at low prices (Field, 1970; Sproles, 1981; Vejlgaard, 2008). For
example, certain clothing and music styles were initiated in the youth and
street culture, or lower income classes. Heterogeneous conformity preferences
can explain both fashion cycles in the demand for goods with no price, as
well as fashions being started by individuals with a low willingness to pay.
The following works have started to investigate heterogeneous confor-
mity preferences as a driver for fashion cycles with formal models. Karni
and Schmeidler (1990) consider a discrete time model with two social classes
α and β. In each time period, 1
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of each class has to choose between three
different consumption options whereby α members want to imitate other α
members and distinguish themselves from β members, and β members want
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to conform to both α and other β members. Consumers are forward looking
over their lifetime which is 9 periods. They show that the demand over time
for each color resembles consecutive life cycles. Matsuyama (1991) analyzes
a random matching game with non-conformists and conformists. Individuals
choose between two consumption options before they are matched. Con-
formists gain a high payoff if their match chose the same option, and non-
conformists gain a high payoff from miscoordination. If intergroup matching
is sufficiently likely and inertia exist in the society, then the demand for the
two options resembles fashion cycles with non-conformists acting as fashion
leader and conformists as followers. Corneo and Jeanne (1999) again distin-
guish between two groups – “natives” and “tourists” – who decide whether
to go to location 1 or 2. Tourists like to go where natives go, but natives do
not want to go where tourists go. Location 2 is only known to some agents
and information about it spreads via a random matching process between
agents. If location 2 is better known among natives initially, then fashion
cycles arise in which the natives act as fashion leader and the tourists as
followers. Berger et al. (2011) introduce a model in which an agent chooses
from a number of goods while being concerned about her social image. This
induces individuals to choose what others who she likes consume, and not to
choose what disliked others consume. The authors provide some qualitative
results and intuition how their model might give rise to fashion cycles, but
they are missing a rigorous analysis of the dynamics of demand. Granovetter
and Soong (1983) model heterogeneous (counter-) conformity preferences by
introducing individual-specific lower and upper thresholds on the fraction of
population above and below which an individual participates in a movement.
If the lower threshold has not been reached, too few people participate in the
movement for the individual to join, whereas if the threshold has been sur-
passed, too many people participate for the individual to join. The authors
find that for certain distributions of lower and upper thresholds across the
population, participation rates oscillate between different levels.
This paper proposes a new simple model with an infinitely heterogeneous
population regarding its conformity preferences in a three-good economy.
This allows us to produce demand dynamics which show the properties of
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fashion cycles as described by traditional fashion theories. Demand for each
option follows consecutive bell-shaped life cycles over time, one fashion sub-
stitutes another, and fashions trickle in a deterministic way through society.
Section 2 outlines the model and section 3 presents the analysis and re-
sults.
2 Model
A unit mass population is continuously and uniformly distributed on the
[0,1]-interval. Every agent is indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] with i being equal to her
location on the [0,1]-interval. An agent’s location is fixed and exogeneously
given.
We propose two interpretations of the [0,1]-interval in line with our hy-
pothesis and the sociological fashion theories. First, the [0,1]-interval can be
interpreted as a scale of social status with i = 0 being the highest status
(maybe richest) agent and i = 1 being the lowest status (maybe poorest)
agent; second, it can be interpreted as a scale of conformity preference with
i = 0 being the most individualistic agent and i = 1 being the most conform-
ing agent.
As to agents’ preferences, we assume that every agent i wants to be similar
to all other agents j < i and wants to distinguish herself from all other agents
j > i. In the context of our two interpretations this means that every agent
wants to emulate agents of higher status and distinguish herself from agents
of lower status or that every agent wants to emulate more individualistic
agents and distinguish herself from more conforming agents. The preferences
will be formalized in the utility function given below.
We assume that the set of all available consumption options S consists
of three styles, S = {A,B,C}. These three styles could be three differently
colored sweatshirts, three cars from different brands, or three different neigh-
borhoods in one city. We assume an equal price for all styles. This allows
us to focus on the effects of heterogeneous conformity preferences. Without
loss of generality we set the price equal to zero.
The economy evolves in discrete time. Agents are assumed to be myopic.
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In each time period t, each agent chooses to consume a style s ∈ S which
maximizes her utility given the distribution of demand in the previous pe-
riod t − 1. The distribution of demand in the previous period is common
knowledge.
In line with the conformity preferences described above, we assume that
agent i’s utility in period t from style s is given by
uit(s) = M
j<i
t−1(s)−M i<jt−1(s)
where M j<it−1(s) is the t − 1 market share of s (mass of agents who consume
s) among all agents j < i and M i<jt−1(s) is the t− 1 market share of s among
all agents j > i. By Mt−1(s) we denote the total market share of s in t− 1.
We introduce a tie-breaking rule for the case that uit(r) = u
i
t(s) with
r 6= s and r, s ∈ S. If uit(A) = uit(B), then i strictly prefers B over A; if
uit(B) = u
i
t(C), then i strictly prefers C over B; and if u
i
t(A) = u
i
t(C), then i
strictly prefers C over A. For the results, it is important that all agents agree
upon which one of two styles is strictly preferred in case of utility equality.
To gain intuition for agents’ preferences consider the following example.
Suppose that in t − 1 all agents i ∈ [0, 0.3) consume A, all i ∈ [0.3, 0.5)
consume B, and all i ∈ [0.5, 1] consume C. Figure 1 shows agent i’s utility
in t for each style given the distribution in t− 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1: uit(s) for all s and i, if in t−1 all i ∈ [0, 0.3) consume A, all i ∈ [0.3, 0.5)
consume B, and all i ∈ [0.5, 1] consume C.
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The utility from style s in t is strictly increasing with a slope of 2 over
the interval of agents who consumed s in t−1, everywhere else it is constant.
From the figure it is obvious that the consumption choices in t are such that
all i ∈ [0, .05] choose B, all i ∈ (.05, .9) choose A, and all i ∈ [.9, 1] choose C.
3 Dynamics of Demand
In this section, we characterize the dynamics of demand which arise in this
model. This means that we exactly characterize for each period t which parts
of the population consume which style, or in other words the distribution of
demand across the population.
A distribution of demand in period t is defined by a boundary vector
bt, which describes a partition of the population (unit interval) in period t,
and a style vector st, which describes which styles the different parts of the
population, as partitioned by bt, consume in period t. This will become clear
in definition 1. For tractability, we restrict initial distributions of demand in
t = 0 to be of one of the types as defined in definition 1.1
Definition 1. Distribution types in time period t.
(i) 1-style-distribution where bt = (0, 1) and st = (x) with x ∈ S:
Every agent i ∈ [0, 1] consumes the same style x in t.
Figure 2: 1-style-distribution.
(ii) 2-styles-distribution where bt = (0, b
1
t , 1) with 0 < b
1
t < 1 and st = (x, y)
with x 6= y and x, y ∈ S:
Every agent i ∈ [0, b1t ) consumes style x, every agent i ∈ (b1t , 1] con-
sumes style y, and agent i = b1t consumes x or y in t.
1The results hold for all initial distributions after which the demand dynamics result
into any of the distribution types as defined in definition 1 for some t ≥ 1.
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Figure 3: 2-styles-distribution.
(iii) 3-styles-distribution where bt = (0, b
1
t , b
2
t , 1) with 0 < b
1
t < b
2
t < 1 and
st = (x, y, z) with x 6= y 6= z 6= x and x, y, z ∈ S:
Every agent i ∈ [0, b1t ) consumes style x, every agent i ∈ (b1t , b2t ) con-
sumes y, and every agent i ∈ (b2t , 1] consumes z. Agent i = b1t consumes
x or y, and agent i = b2t consumes y or z.
Figure 4: 3-styles-distribution.
In the following, it is shown that the dynamics of demand converge to
the same unique sequence of distributions for any of the possible initial dis-
tributions. Denote by Σt the set of all styles s for which Mt(s) = 0. Thus
these are the styles which do not receive any demand in t. Let max be the
function which picks the style with the highest position in the alphabet from
some set of styles, with C having the highest position (3) in S.
Lemma 3.1. If the distribution in t is a 1-style distribution, then the distri-
bution in t+ 1 is a 2-styles-distribution.
Proof. Given a 1-style-distribution in t with bt = (0, 1), st = (x) and Σt =
{y, z}, in t + 1 every i ∈ [0, 1
2
) chooses max {y, z} in order to differentiate
herself from more conformist agents as uit+1(s) = 0 > u
i
t+1(x) for all s ∈ Σt.
For i = 1
2
, uit+1(s) = 0 = u
i
t+1(x) for all s ∈ Σt and thus i = 12 chooses
max {max {y, z} , x}. The more conformist agents are still satisfied with their
choice in t because everybody was consuming x in t. For all i ∈ (1
2
, 1],
uit+1(s) = 0 < u
i
t+1(x) for all s ∈ Σt such that every i ∈ (12 , 1] consumes x in
t+ 1. Figure 5 exemplifies the distributions in t and t+ 1.
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Figure 5: Proof for Lemma 3.1.
For the next lemma, we introduce an equivalence notion for distributions.
Observe that some distribution d in t in which i = 0 consumes x and all i > 0
consume y is not a 1-style-distribution. It is however mass equivalent to the
1-style-distribution with bt = (0, 1) and st = (y) as i = 0 has mass zero. This
means that the consumption decision of all i in t+1 is the same regardless of
whether the distribution in t is d or the 1-style-distribution with bt = (0, 1)
and st = (y). We will say that two distributions of consumption d and d
′ are
mass equivalent if the differences between them are mass zero.
Lemma 3.2. If the distribution in t is a 3-styles-distribution, then the dis-
tribution in t+k for some k ≥ 1 is mass equivalent to a 2-styles-distribution.
Proof. In this proof, we first derive the distribution of consumption in t+ 1
for any 3-styles-distribution in t. Let bt = (0, b
1
t , b
2
t , 1) and st = (x, y, z) with
x 6= y 6= z 6= x and x, y, z ∈ S.
The analysis is split into cases each of which represents a different ordering
of the population masses in the consumption intervals in t. For convenience,
the length of the most left consumption interval in t will be denoted by 1t,
the length of the central consumption interval by 2t, and the length of the
most right consumption interval by 3t. Hence, 1t := b
1
t , 2t := b
2
t − b1t , and
3t := 1− b2t .
We describe the case of 1t = 2t = 3t here in detail to provide intuition
for how the t + 1 distribution arises. All other cases are relegated to the
appendix. If 1t = 2t = 3t, then bt = (0,
1
3
, 2
3
, 1). In t + 1, every style s ∈ S
yields u0t+1(s) = −13 to agent 0 and thus i = 0 chooses maxS. All i ∈ (0, 23)
imitate the period t choice of the most individualist agents and choose x.
All i ∈ [2
3
, 1) get the same positive utility from x and y and thus choose
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max {x, y}. Agent 1 obtains u1t+1(s) = 13 for any s ∈ S and thus chooses
maxS.
Figure 6 depicts the distribution in t and the distribution in t+ 1. Mass
zero events – in this case, the choices of agent 0 and agent 1 – are not shown
in this or any other figure in this paper.
Figure 6: Proof of Lemma 3.2, case 1t = 2t = 3t.
The t+ 1 distribution is mass equivalent to the 1-style-distribution with
bt+1 = (0, 1) and st+1 = (x), if x = max {x, y}, or to the 2-styles-distribution
with bt+1 = (0,
2
3
, 1) and st+1 = (x, y), if y = max {x, y}.
We summarize the results up to here, including those derived in the ap-
pendix, in figure 7. The figure provides an overview of the distributions in
t+1 resulting from any 3-styles-distribution in t. The notation “1 < 2 < 3→
1 = 2 > 3” means that a 3-styles-distribution with property 1t < 2t < 3t in
period t results into a (distribution mass equivalent to a) 3-styles-distribution
with property 1t+1 = 2t+1 > 3t+1 in period t + 1, and analogously for all
other cases. With figure 7 it is easy to verify that any 3-styles-distribution
in t results into a distribution mass equivalent to a 2-styles-distribution in
t+ k for some k ∈ [1, 3].
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Figure 7: Proof of Lemma 3.2, summary.
Thus, eventually any 1-style- and 3-styles-distribution results into (a dis-
tribution mass equivalent to) a 2-styles-distribution. Next, we show that the
dynamics following any 2-styles-distribution converge to a unique sequence
of distributions of consumption.
Lemma 3.3. The dynamics following any 2-styles-distribution converge to
a unique cycle C of distributions. This unique cycle is equal to the infinite
repetition of the sequence of distributions from t to t + 8, given in Figure
8, where x 6= y 6= z 6= x and x, y, z ∈ S. Thus, in C the distribution of
consumption in any period t is equal to the distribution of consumption in
period t+ 9.
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Figure 8: The sequence of distributions from t to t + 8 is infinitely repeated in
cycle C.
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Proof. We show that the dynamics of the distribution of consumption follow-
ing any 2-styles-distribution in t with bt = (0, b
1
t , 1), st = (x, y) and Σt = {z}
where x 6= y 6= z 6= x and x, y, z ∈ S converge to C. For the proof, we
divide all 2-styles-distributions in t into eight different cases depending on
their value of b1t and derive the resulting dynamics for each case. The case
of 0 < b1t ≤ 13 will be discussed in detail here, whereas all other cases are
relegated to the appendix.
If 0 < b1t ≤ 13 , then the distribution in t+ 1 is a 3-styles-distribution with
bt+1 =
(
0, 1
2
b1t ,
1
2
(2b1t + 1) , 1
)
and st+1 = (z, x, y). Thus, 2t+1 > 3t+1 ≥ 1t+1.
In t+ 2, the distribution is mass equivalent to the 2-styles-distribution with
b1t+2 =
1
2
(
2b1t+1 + b
2
t+1
)
and st+2 = (z, x). These dynamics are shown in figure
9.
Figure 9: Proof of Lemma 3.3, case 0 < b1t ≤ 13 .
For the remainder of this proof it is useful to further divide this case into
four sub-cases and to provide the possible values of consumption interval
boundaries for each sub-case.
(1a) If 0 < b1t ≤ 112 , then b1t+1 ∈ (0, 124 ], b2t+1 ∈ (12 , 712 ], and b1t+2 ∈ (14 , 13 ].
(1b) If 1
12
< b1t <
1
4
, then b1t+1 ∈ ( 124 , 18), b2t+1 ∈ ( 712 , 34), and b1t+2 ∈ (13 , 12).
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(1c) If b1t =
1
4
, then b1t+1 =
1
8
, b2t+1 =
3
4
, and b1t+2 =
1
2
.
(1d) If 1
4
< b1t ≤ 13 , then b1t+1 ∈ (18 , 16 ], b2t+1 ∈ (34 , 56 ] and b1t+2 ∈ (12 , 712 ].
The cases of 1
3
< b1t <
1
2
and 1
2
≤ b1t ≤ 1 (the latter one split into three
sub-cases) are relegated to the appendix.
The analysis up to here reveals that any 2-styles-distribution in t is fol-
lowed by a 2-styles-distribution again in t + 3 or earlier. We summarize the
results from the analysis, including the ones in the appendix, in figure 10.
The notation “0 < b1 ≤ 1
12
→ 1
4
< b1 ≤ 1
3
” means that a 2-styles-distribution
in t with 0 < b1t ≤ 112 is followed by a 2-styles-distribution in t + k with
1
4
< b1t+k ≤ 13 for some k ∈ [1, 3], and analogously for all other cases.
Figure 10: Proof of Lemma 3.3, summary of all cases.
Thus, it remains to show that the two sequences of distributions implied
by I. and II. where
I. implies
a 2-styles-distribution in t with b1t =
1
4
,
a 2-styles-distribution in t+ 2 with b1t+2 =
1
2
,
a 2-styles-distribution in t+ 3 with b1t+3 =
1
4
,
and so on, and
II. implies
a 2-styles-distribution in t with b1t ∈ (14 , 13 ],
a 2-styles-distribution in t+ 2 with b1t+2 ∈ (12 , 23 ],
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a 2-styles-distribution in t+ 3 with b1t+3 ∈ (14 , 13 ],
and so on,
both converge to C.
First, observe that the sequence of distributions implied by I. is equal to
C.
Second, we show that the sequence of distributions implied by II. con-
verges to C. Assume w.l.o.g. that the distribution in t is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t ∈ (14 , 13 ]. Hence, in t+1 the distribution is a 3-styles-distribution with
b1t+1 =
1
2
b1t ∈ (18 , 16 ] and b2t+1 = 12 (2b1t + 1) ∈ (34 , 56 ]. In t + 2 the distribution
is mass equivalent to a 2-styles-distribution with b1t+2 =
1
2
(
2b1t+1 + b
2
t+1
)
=
b1t +
1
4
∈ (1
2
, 7
12
]. The distribution in t + 3 is a 2-styles-distribution with
b1t+3 =
1
2
b1t+2 =
1
2
b1t +
1
8
∈ (1
4
, b1t ) because
1
4
< b1t . Since b
1
t+3 < b
1
t , then
also b1t+4 < b
1
t+1 and b
2
t+4 < b
2
t+1, and b
1
t+5 < b
1
t+2. Thus, limk→∞ b
1
t+3k =
1
4
,
limk→∞, b1t+3k+1 =
1
8
, limk→∞ b2t+3k+1 =
3
4
and limk→∞ b1t+3k+2 =
1
2
and in the
limit the sequence of distributions implied by II. converges to C.
With the previous lemmata, we establish our main result.
Proposition 3.4. The dynamics of the distribution of consumption converge
to C for any initial 1-style-, 2-styles- or 3-styles-distribution.
Proof. By the previous lemmata, any 1-style- and 3-styles-distribution in t is
followed by a 2-styles-distribution in t+ k for some k ≥ 1 and the dynamics
of the distribution of consumption after any 2-styles-distribution converge to
C.
Within cycle C, the dynamics of overall demand possess the properties
ascribed to fashion cycles. First, the demand for each style follows recurring
life cycles, second, there is an ever-going change in fashions because the life
cycles of different options peak at different points in time, and, third, within
one life cycle of a style, the style “trickles” deterministically through society
from individualist/higher status individuals to conformist/lower status indi-
viduals. This is synthesized in the following two corollaries and explained in
the next paragraphs.
17
Corollary 3.5. In cycle C, the demand for every style follows a unique se-
quence of market shares M , which resembles two consecutive life cycles, in in-
finite repetition. The sequence of market shares is given by M = (0, 1
4
, 5
8
, 1
2
, 0, 1
8
, 1
2
, 3
4
, 1
4
).
In cycle C, each style faces a demand of zero in some period t and in t+1
it enters the market with a demand of 1
4
of the population. In t+ 2, demand
for this style grows to 5
8
and the style is at the peak of its life cycle. In t+ 3,
demand for the style declines to 1
2
before the style is abandoned by every
consumer and is not consumed for one period in t + 4. Having been out of
the market for one period, the style sees a revival in t + 5 and enters into
another life cycle experiencing a positive demand for exactly four consecutive
time periods. Demand starts out at 1
8
in t + 5, increases to 1
2
in t + 6 and
further to 3
4
in t+ 7. In t+ 8 demand for the style drops to 1
4
before it leaves
the market again in t+ 9 for one period. Then, the process starts over again;
period t + 9 is equal to period t in the life cycle process. The reappearance
of a product in the market after a period of zero demand in our model is due
to the limited set of consumption options. Revivals of fashions and brands
can be commonly observed in reality. Ray Ban glasses, platform shoes and
flares are examples for this.
Corollary 3.5 is consistent with research on product life cycles (for a
discussion see Rink and Swan, 1979) which divides the evolution of demand
for a product into four stages: the initial phase of introduction with low
demand, the growth phase with rising demand, the maturity phase where
demand has reached its peak, and finally a phase of decline where demand
decreases until the product is out of the market.
The life cycles of different styles peak at different points in time. This
reproduces an ever-going change in fashions where one fashion is substituted
by another. Figure 11, which plots the demand for each style in cycle C
over 9 periods, exemplifies this feature. Given C, there exists period t where
styles x and y with x 6= y 6= z 6= x each receive 1
2
of total demand.
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Figure 11: Dynamic demand for each style in cycle C. The overall pattern of
dynamic demand exhibits continuous fashion cycles.
Corollary 3.6. Within one life cycle, a style trickles from the “left” to the
“right” of the population. In the first life cycle in M , the style is initially
consumed by all i ≤ 1
4
, subsequently by all i ∈ [1
8
, 3
4
], and final demand comes
from all i ≥ 1
2
. In the second life cycle in M , the style is initially consumed
by all i ≤ 1
8
, subsequently by all i ≤ 1
2
, then by all i ≥ 1
4
, and final demand
comes from all i ≥ 3
4
.
Within one life cycle, each consumption option trickles deterministically
through society from the left to the right of the unit interval. Initial demand
for a product comes from consumers “at the left” of society, then the product
moves over “centre” consumers to consumers “at the right” of society, when
the “left” of society has abandoned the product already. Finally the product
trickles out of the market. This is in line with the different “trickling” theories
for fashion which were reviewed in the introduction.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model to explain fashion cycles through heterogeneous
conformity preferences only. The overall demand dynamics for three options
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which result from the model resemble fashion cycles which are in line with
traditional sociological fashion theories. The demand for each style over time
follows consecutive life cycles in each of which demand for the style takes a
bell-shaped pattern and the style trickles in a deterministic way through
society. Moreover, an ever-going change of fashions arises because the life
cycles for different styles peak at different times.
This followed from the result that the demand dynamics converge to a
unique cycle C of demand distributions after any 1-style-, 2- and 3-styles-
distribution. In cycle C, demand over time exhibits the above discussed
fashion cycle properties.
We hold a strong conjecture that the demand dynamics possess the same
fashion cycle properties if the number of consumption options is general-
ized to n. To prove that the results are robust to increasing the number of
consumption options would be an interesting extension. Another promising
direction for future research would be to include firms into the model as
strategic actors which can set prices and decide about when to introduce a
new style.
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Appendix
Remainder of the Proof for Lemma 3.2.
1. If 1t > 2t = 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t −Mt (max {y, z})) and st+1 = (max {y, z} , x).
2. If 1t < 2t = 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is mass equivalent to a
2-styles-distribution with b1t+1 =
1
2
(2b1t + b
2
t ) and st+1 = (x, y).
3. If 1t = 2t > 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 3t) and st+1 = (z, x) in case x = max {x, y}. In
case y = max {x, y}, the t + 1 distribution is a 3-styles-distribution
with bt+1 = (0,
1
2
(b1t − 3t) , b2t , 1) and st+1 = (z, x, y). Given a 3-styles-
distribution in t + 1, the relation between population masses in con-
sumption intervals is 1t+1 < 2t+1 > 3t+1.
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4. If 1t = 2t < 3t, then the t+1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution with
b1t+1 =
1
2
(b2t + 1t + 1), and st+1 = (x, z) in case x = max {x, y}. In case
y = max {x, y}, the t + 1 distribution is mass equivalent to a 3-styles-
distribution with bt+1 = (0, b
2
t ,
1
2
(b2t + 2t + 1) , 1) and s
1
t+1 = (x, y, z).
Given a 3-styles-distribution in t+ 1, 2t+1 > 3t+1.
5. If 1t > 2t > 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 3t) and st+1 = (z, x).
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6. If 1t > 3t > 2t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 2t) and st+1 = (y, x).
7. If 1t = 3t > 2t, then the t + 1 distribution is mass equivalent to a
2-styles-distribution with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 2t) and st+1 = (y, x).
8. If 3t > 1t > 2t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 3-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 2t) and b2t+1 = 12 (b2t + 1t + 1), and st+1 = (y, x, z).
The relation between population masses is 1t+1 < 2t+1 > 3t+1.
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9. If 2t > 1t > 3t, then the t+1 distribution is a 3-styles-distribution with
b1t+1 =
1
2
(b1t − 3t) and b2t+1 = 12 (2b1t + b2t ), and st+1 = (z, x, y). The
relation between population masses is 1t+1 < 2t+1 > 3t+1. Observe
that 1t+1 < 1t and 3t+1 > 3t because b
1
t+1 < b
1
t and b
2
t+1 < b
2
t . Hence,
eventually every 3-styles-distribution with 2t > 1t > 3t results into a
3-styles-distribution with 2t+1 > 3t+1 ≥ 1t+1.
10. If 2t > 1t = 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is mass equivalent to a
2-styles-distribution with b1t+1 =
1
2
(2b1t + b
2
t ), and st+1 = (x, y).
11. If 2t > 3t > 1t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(2b1t + b
2
t ), and st+1 = (x, y).
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12. If 1t < 2t < 3t, then the t + 1 distribution is a 3-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
(2b1t + b
2
t ) and b
2
t+1 =
1
2
(b2t + 2t + 1), and st+1 = (x, y, z).
Thus, 2t+1 > 3t+1.
Remainder of the Proof for Lemma 3.3.
1. If 1
3
< b1t <
1
2
,
then the distribution in t + 1 is a 3-styles-distribution with b1t+1 =
1
2
b1t ∈ (16 , 14) and b2t+1 = 12 (2b1t + 1) ∈ (56 , 1). Thus, 2t+1 > 1t+1 > 3t+1.
Moreover, st+1 = (z, x, y).
In t+2 the distribution is a 3-styles-distribution with b1t+2 =
1
2
(
b1t+1 − 3t+1
) ∈
(0, 1
8
) and b2t+2 =
1
2
(
2b1t+1 + b
2
t+1
) ∈ ( 7
12
, 3
4
). Thus, 2t+2 > 3t+2 > 1t+2.
Moreover, st+2 = (y, z, x).
In t+3 a 2-styles-distribution is reached again with b1t+3 =
1
2
(
2b1t+2 + b
2
t+2
) ∈
( 7
24
, 1
2
).
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Thus, a 2-styles-distribution in t with 1
3
< b1t <
1
2
results into a 2-
styles-distribution with either 1
3
< b1t+3 <
1
2
again or 1
4
< b1t+3 ≤ 13
in the short run; in the long run, however, it results into a 2-styles-
distribution with 1
4
< b1t+3 ≤ 13 with certainty because b1t+3 < b1t for the
2-styles-distribution in t + 3 following from any 2-styles-distribution
with 1
3
< b1t <
1
2
in t.
2. If 1
2
≤ b1t < 1,
then the distribution in t+1 is mass equivalent to a 2-styles-distribution
with b1t+1 =
1
2
b1t . Moreover, st+1 = (z, x).
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Again, it is useful to further divide this case into sub-cases and provide
the possible values of the consumption interval boundary b1t+1 for each
sub-case.
(a) If b1t =
1
2
, then b1t+1 =
1
4
.
(b) If 1
2
< b1t ≤ 23 , then b1t+1 ∈ (14 , 13 ].
(c) If 2
3
< b1t < 1, then b
1
t+1 ∈ (13 , 12).
27
References
Ariely, D. and Levav, J. (2000), ‘Sequential choice in group settings: Taking
the road less traveled and less enjoyed’, Journal of Consumer Research
27, 279–290.
Asch, S. E. (1951), Effects of group pressure upon the modification and
distortion of judgments, in H. S. Guetzkow, ed., ‘Groups, leadership and
men’, Carnegie Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 177–190.
Berger, J. and Heath, C. (2008), ‘Who drives divergence? Identity signaling,
outgroup dissimilarity, and the abandonment of cultural tastes’, Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 95(3), 593–607.
Berger, J., Ho, B. and Joshi, Y. (2011), ‘Identity signaling with social capi-
tal: A model of symbolic consumption’, Social Science Research Network
Working Paper Series .
URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1828848
Blumer, H. (1969), ‘Fashion: From class differentiation to collective selec-
tion’, The Sociological Quarterly 10(3), 275–291.
Bourdieu, P. (1984), Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Bourdieu, P. (1993), Sociology in question, Sage, London.
Cholachatpinyo, A., Padgett, I., Crocker, M. and Fletcher, B. (2002), ‘A
conceptual model of the fashion process - part II: An empirical investi-
gation of the micro-subjective level’, Journal of Fashion Marketing and
Management 6(1), 24–34.
Corneo, G. G. and Jeanne, O. (1999), ‘Segmented communication and
fashionable behavior’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
39(4), 371–385.
Field, G. A. (1970), ‘The status float phenomenon’, Business Horizons
13(4), 45–52.
28
Granovetter, M. and Soong, R. (1983), ‘Threshold models of diffusion and
collective behavior’, The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 9(3), 165–179.
Karni, E. and Schmeidler, D. (1990), ‘Fixed preferences and changing tastes’,
The American Economic Review 80(2), 262–267.
King, C. W. (1965), Fashion adoption: A rebuttal to the ”trickle down”
theory, in J. U. McNeal, ed., ‘Dimensions of consumer behavior’, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, New York, pp. 114–127.
Kotler, P. (1997), Principles of marketing, European edn, Prentice-Hall, Lon-
don.
Lynn, M. and Harris, J. (1997), ‘Individual differences in the pursuit of self-
uniqueness through consumption’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology
27(21), 1861–1883.
Matsuyama, K. (1991), ‘Custom versus fashion: Hysteresis and limit cycles
in a random matching game’, Center for Mathematical Studies in Eco-
nomics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Discussion
Paper 940.
URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/940.pdf
McCracken, G. D. (1988), Culture and consumption: New approaches to the
symbolic character of consumer goods and activities, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington.
Park, K. (1998), ‘Individuality on fashion diffusion: Differentiation versus
independence’, Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management 2(4), 352–
360.
Pesendorfer, W. (1995), ‘Design innovation and fashion cycles’, The Ameri-
can Economic Review pp. 771–792.
Rink, D. R. and Swan, J. E. (1979), ‘Product life cycle research: A literature
review’, Journal of Business Research 7(3), 219 – 242.
29
Simmel, G. (1957), ‘Fashion’, The American Journal of Sociology 62(6), 541–
558.
Snyder, C. R. and Fromkin, H. L. (1980), Uniqueness: The human pursuit
of difference, Perspectives in social psychology, Plenum Press, New York.
Sproles, G. B. (1981), ‘Analysing fashion life cycles: Principles and perspec-
tives’, Journal of Marketing 45(4), 116–124.
Timmor, Y. and Katz-Navon, T. (2008), ‘Being the same and different: A
model explaining new product adoption’, Journal of Consumer Behaviour
7(3), 249–262.
Veblen, T. (1912), The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of
institutions, Macmillan, New York, London.
Vejlgaard, H. (2008), Anatomy of a trend, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Workman, J. E. and Kidd, L. K. (2000), ‘Use of the need for uniqueness scale
to characterize fashion consumer groups’, Clothing and Textiles Research
Journal 18(4), 227–236.
Yoganarasimhan, H. (2017), ‘Identifying the presence and cause of fashion
cycles in data’, Journal of Marketing Research 54(1), 5–26.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.15.0119
30
